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During the first week of December, President Trump hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

These divergent actions highlights the central feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—though how this fits with the new military strikes in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This pivot is consequential, but experts caution it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Targeted Action

A comparable confrontation flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Other Powers

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.